Among growing concerns about potential financial stability risks posed by institutional investors, herding has been considered as an important risk amplification channel. In this paper, we examine the extent to which major institutional investors of corporate bonds-mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds-herd in their trading and quantify the price impact of such herding behavior. We find that, relative to what is documented for the equity market, the level of institutional herding across all types of investors is much higher in the corporate bond market, particularly in lower-rated bonds. In addition, institutions have become increasingly likely to sell in herds over time, a trend purely driven by mutual funds. We also show that institutional herding is associated with bonds' performance and rating changes, and is not only intratemporal, but also intertemporal. Such persistence in herding is largely driven by institutions imitating others' trading behavior in the previous quarter. Finally, we document an asymmetry in the price impact of herding. While buy herding facilitates price discovery, sell herding results in transitory yet significant price distortions. The price destabilizing effect of sell herding is particularly strong for high-yield bonds, small bonds, and illiquid bonds, and during the global financial crisis.
Introduction
In recent years, regulators, researchers, and market participants have become increasingly concerned about the role of institutional investors in transmitting and amplifying financial shocks, particularly in the fixed-income markets (Stein (2014); Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz, and Shin (2014); FSOC (2015) ).
1 Such concerns largely derive from two trends in the market structure: the decreasing capacity of broker-dealers to provide liquidity in times of stress due to their shrinking balance sheet and the increasing share of fixed-income securities held by institutional investors who may demand liquidity at the same time.
Among the growing concerns about the potential financial stability risks posed by institutional investors, one important amplification channel that has garnered much attention is herding-the collective buying and selling by a group of institutional investors in the same securities at the same time (OFR (2013) , IMF (2015) ). Herding could be destabilizing or contagious if it drives prices to deviate from their fundamentals, particularly on the downside. Such price impact may provide enough of a first-mover advantage to accelerate investor exits, which will further depress prices.
2 Markets for risky fixed-income securities are particularly susceptible to this type of run risk, as bonds are generally traded in illiquid and opaque over-the-counter (OTC) markets and may be more sensitive to interest rate shocks in the current monetary policy normalization process (Stein (2014) ).
However, empirical evidence on institutional herding in the fixed-income markets is scant at best, and little is known about the effect of herding behavior on bond prices. Most of the existing studies on herding have focused on the equity markets (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) ; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) ; Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) ; Wermers (1999) ; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003) ; Sias (2004); and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) ). The level of herding was generally found to be low, though somewhat higher for the subset of stocks with low liquidity or less information transparency, such as small stocks. Evidence on the price impact of herding in stocks are generally mixed, and small in magnitude.
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In this paper, we fill the gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of institutional herding in the U.S. corporate bond market and focus particularly on the price impact of herding as a way to assess its materiality in amplifying financial stability risks.
The market for corporate bonds is massive in size, reaching $9.2 trillion as of the end of
2014.
4 Institutional investors play a dominant role by accounting for a large and increasing share of both holdings and trading volume. 5 More important, like most risky fixed-income securities, corporate bonds are traded in an opaque, illiquid OTC market, where the price impact is often believed to be more substantial.
Using a comprehensive data set on U.S. corporate bond holdings by institutional investors, we first estimate the magnitude of institutional herding based on the measure introduced by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) (henceforth "LSV"). We then explore factors that drive both cross-sectional and time-series variation in herding. Finally, we apply a portfolio approach to study the price impact of herding. Importantly, we distinguish three main types of investors-namely, mutual funds, insurance companies, and pension funds-in examining the prevalence of herding behavior and its price impact.
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that average levels of institutional herding in corporate bonds are substantially higher than what are documented for stocks, for all investor types. Specifically, we find that the average herding level for pension funds' corpo-rate bond investment is 9 percent, much higher than the the 2.7-percent average for their equity investment; 6 the average herding level for mutual funds' corporate bond investment is 10 percent, also much higher than the 3.4-percent average for their equity investment; 7 insurance companies, the largest investor group of corporate bonds, have a greater tendency in general to trade in sync than mutual funds and pension funds, boasting an average herding level of 13 percent. Looking at subgroups of corporate bonds, we find an even higher level of herding in lower-rated bonds. 8 In addition, we document a higher level of herding in corporate bonds that are traded more actively, a pattern not observed in trading of stocks.
We also find that institutional herding in corporate bonds is significantly stronger on the sell side than on the buy side, purely driven by mutual funds, the fastest-growing group of corporate bond investors. Mutual funds also stand out along a few other dimensions.
Particularly, mutual funds exhibit significant trends in their herding behavior that dominate other institutional investors, with their buy herding levels trending down and sell herding levels trending up over time. Such persistent increase in the level of sell herding is particularly relevant for financial stability since corporate bond mutual funds offer significant liquidity transformation by allowing daily redemptions while investing in relatively illiquid assets.
When mutual funds herd to sell in an attempt to meet investor redemptions, their demand for immediacy and liquidity may trigger large price concessions amid asset fire sales.
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Second, we identify key factors that drive herding by different types of investors. We find that all investors herd to buy winning bonds and herd to sell losing bonds, with insurance companies' herding behavior most sensitive to bonds' past performance. 10 Interestingly, this 6 The average herding level for pension funds' equity investment is calculated by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) 
7 The average herding level for mutual funds' equity investment is calculated to be 3.4 percent and 3.3 percent by Wermers (1999) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) , respectively.
8 We estimate the average herding level to be 9 percent for investment-grade corporate bonds, 12 percent for high-yield bonds, and 22 percent for unrated bonds.
9 Mutual funds who hold lower-rated corporate bonds are especially susceptible to such downward spirals, and they may block redemptions when facing heavy liquidation needs, which may trigger larger and widerspread concerns on the condition of other high-yield funds, as we observed during December 2015 when the distressed debt fund Third Avenue blocked clients from pulling their money in order to liquidate its holdings in an orderly fashion, which triggered significant concerns on the general health of high-yield mutual funds.
10 This result is consistent with the finding by Becker and Ivashina (2015) , who document that conditional herding-to-performance relationship is nonlinear. Specifically, we find that extreme bad past performances are associated with disproportionally large selling herds, while top-performing bonds do not attract disproportionally large buying herds. Such asymmetry suggests that bonds' extremely bad past performances may trigger a large amount of simultaneous sells from institutional investors, which could depress prices further to encourage more sells, a downward spiral scenario. Our empirical results echo previous findings that bond mutual funds' outflows are sensitive to bad performance more than their inflows are sensitive to good performance-documented by Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng (2015)-and further suggest that when bond mutual funds experience outflows because of bad past performance, they are more likely to liquidate the same bonds.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, insurance companies react more to rating-change events, particularly downgrades, consistent with the fact that they are subject to rating-based regulatory constraints. There is some evidence that mutual funds and pension funds take advantage of such market frictions to buy bonds when insurance companies are forced to sell. Lastly, we find that all institutional investors herd more in lower-rated and smaller-sized bonds.
Third, we document strong persistence in herding, especially on the sell side. We show that bond investors not only herd within a quarter, but also herd over adjacent quarters.
In fact, intertemporal correlation in corporate bond trading is much higher than that in equity trading, especially for insurance companies. Following Sias (2004) , we decompose intertemporal herding into an imitation component (institutional investors follow others into and out of the same securities) and a habit component (investors follow their own trades in the last quarter). Sias (2004) documents that the two components contribute almost equally to the positive intertemporal correlation in stock trading. In contrast, we find that the positive intertemporal correlation in bond trading is mostly driven by institutions following others' trades. This imitation-driven intertemporal herding suggests that herding in the bond market is more akin to run behaviors than in the equity market.
on credit ratings, insurance companies' portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield corporate bonds, a behavior described as "reaching-for-yield".
Finally, and most importantly, we document a significant price-destabilizing effect of sell herding, suggesting that sell-side institutional herding could pose substantial risks to financial stability. We find that while buy herding is associated with permanent price impact that facilitates price discovery, sell herding results in transitory yet significant price distortions and therefore excess price volatility. The impact of institutional trading on long-term corporate bond returns is substantial. In particular, when investors herd to sell, bond prices fall substantially during the event period but reverse gradually over the following quarters. A contrarian portfolio longing bonds with the highest sell herding measures and shorting bonds with the highest buy herding measures generates a cumulative abnormal return of 2.5 percent in six quarters after portfolio formation. Such an abnormal return is entirely driven by subsequent return reversals in bonds that experience heavy sell herding in the event period.
This evidence is consistent with what Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) find in the equity market, but it is much stronger in magnitude.
We also find that the destabilizing effect of sell herding is particularly strong for high-yield bonds, small bonds, and illiquid bonds, and during the global financial crisis. Specifically, the contrarian portfolio described above generates a cumulative abnormal return of 6 percent if constructed with high-yield bonds, 4 percent with small bonds, and 5 percent with less-liquid bonds, in six quarters after portfolio formation. If we focus on the [2007] [2008] [2009] financial crisis period, the price destabilizing effect is as high as 8 percent, much larger than what is estimated for the full sample period. Overall, our results clearly point to the vulnerabilities associated with institutional herding in the coporate bond market, i.e., the price-destabilizing effect is strongest for the most risky bonds during periods of market distress. To our knowledge, this is the the first paper that documents a price-destabilizing effect of correlated trading by corporate bond investors.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we complement the literature on the investment behavior of institutions, specifically, institutional herding. While extensive studies have been conducted on herding behavior of institutional investors in the equity market (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) ; Wermers (1999); and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) ), little is known about bond investors. Our paper provides the first comprehensive study of the level, cause and effect of institutional herding in the corporate bond market, across different types of investors.
Second, our paper fills a gap in understanding the potential financial stability risks posed by institutional investors' herding behavior. Earlier studies on the stock market find some evidence that institutional herding tends to move prices toward, rather than away from equilibrium values, because institutions are better informed and likely herd to undervalued stocks and away from overvalued stocks. 11 However, papers that focus on more recent stock markets document some price-destabilizing effects of institutional herding, especially on the sell side.
12 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the price impact of herding in the fixed-income market, and the first to document the asymmetric effects of buy and sell herding on bond prices. In particular, we find that in the corporate bond market, while buy-side herding facilitates price discovery, sell-side herding results in significant price distortions. Such price-destabilizing effects of sell-side herding is a lot more significant and larger in magnitude than what is documented for the stock market, and suggest that the growing concern about financial stability risks associated with institutional herding is warranted in the fixed-income market.
Third, we add to the emerging literature on the behavior of corporate-bond institutional investors. While institutional investor behavior has been a central topic of the asset management literature, most of the papers focus on equity investors. 13 Recent turmoil in the fixed-income market aroused the soring demand for a better understanding of the behavior of corporate bond investors. 14 We complement the literature by providing a comprehensive 11 See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992); Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992); Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994); Wermers (1999); and Sias (2004) .
12 See Sharma, Easterwood, and Kumar (2006) ; Puckett and Yan (2008); Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011); and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) .
13 See, for examples, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) ; Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ; Coval and Stafford (2007) .
14 Chen and Qin (2015) and Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng (2015) explore the flow-to-performance patterns of corporate bond mutual funds, Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2010b) evaluate the timing ability of bond funds, analysis on the trading behavior and price impact of three major institutional investors of corporate bonds-mutual funds, insurance companies, and pension funds.
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on corporate bond pricing and market liquidity. Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) examine the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its strong asset-pricing implications. Cici, Gibson, and Merrick (2011) and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) document the liquidity improvement in the corporate bond market after the TRACE reporting system was introduced. Huang, Sun, Yao, and Yu (2013) examine how corporate bond investors' liquidity preferences interact with bond prices. Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2013) documents significant return momentum in noninvestment-grade bonds. Our paper sheds new light on the relationship between institutional herding and illiquidity in the corporate bond market, by showing that market illiquidity reinforces the price impact of herding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sampling, and our construction of herding measures; Section 3 assesses the levels and determinants of herding; Section 4 explores the price dynamics associated with herding; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data, Sampling, and Herding Measures
Data and Sampling
The data for our analysis are compiled from multiple data sources and cover the period from 1998:Q3 to 2014:Q3. We obtain data on corporate bond holdings by institutional investors from Thomson Reuters Lipper eMAXX. This database has comprehensive coverage of quarterly fixed-income holdings of insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Moneta (2015) studies the relationship between bond fund performance and their portfolio holdings, Becker and Ivashina (2015) document a "reaching-for-yield" behavior of insurance companies in their investment on corporate bonds, and Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) and Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011) study the fire-sale behavior of bond mutual fund and insurance companies during the crisis, respectively.
15 Some other institutional investors, such as hedge funds, foundations or endowments, governments, and health care systems, constitute about 1 percent of the data and are excluded from the sample. To address the We refer to these institutional investors generally as "funds," "investors," or "institutions" throughout the paper.
We focus on dollar-denominated corporate bonds issued by U.S. companies and held by U.S. funds. We also restrict our sample to fixed-coupon bonds, which make up about 95 percent of total observations. Notably, we exclude bonds that are either newly issued (within four quarters of issuance) or close to maturity (with less than four quarters to maturity) to focus on trading strategies unrelated to natural portfolio updates upon issuances or maturities. This exclusion criterion follows Wermers (1999) , who excludes newly issued stocks for one year after their first offering date.
Figure 1 illustrates our data coverage over time. Figure 1a shows that over the sample period 1998:Q3 to 2014:Q3, the number of insurance companies was relatively stable at around 3,000, the number of mutual funds trended up from around 1,300 to 2,000, and the number of pension funds fluctuated between 150 and 900. Figure 1b shows that institutions covered in our data held up to 30,000 unique corporate bonds in a given quarter. Both mutual funds and pensions funds substantially increased the number of bonds in their portfolios over time. Figure 1c presents the dollar value of corporate bond holdings covered by our sample, which rose from $1 trillion to $2.7 trillion over time, with the majority of this increase recorded in the post-crisis period. Over time, this coverage steadily represented roughly one-third of the U.S. corporate bond universe.
16 Insurance companies' market share, as a percentage to total holdings of the three types of funds, declined from 76 percent to 61 percent, while mutual funds' market share advanced from 19 percent to 34 percent.
How actively does a typical institution trade corporate bonds? Table I caveat of this definition of "trades" is that quarter-end portfolio snapshots miss intraquarter round-trip transactions. However, the relative low frequency of corporate bond trading helps alleviate this issue. As shown in Table I , in the 2011-2014 period, an average institutional investor holds 134 corporate bonds worth $403 million in total, increases holdings of 21 bonds in a quarter, and reduces holdings of 20 bonds over the same period, among which roughly 9 "active" purchases and 13 "active" sales are made.
17 It is worth noting that mutual funds and pension funds have become significantly more active in trading, while insurance companies' level of activity has remained stable and low. On average, mutual funds are the most active traders of corporate bonds. has an outstanding amount of $662 million-among which $246 million is held by 34 eMAXX investors-is about four years after issuance, and has nine years remaining to maturity. On average, it is sold by 13 institutions and bought by 9 institutions in a quarter. As for holding concentration, institutional holding of investment-grade bonds gets less concentrated over time, while holding concentration of high-yield bonds remains stable. As for trading intensity, in a typical quarter after 2007, both investment-grade and high-yield bonds are traded by more funds on both buy and sell sides than before. 
Herding Measures
Following the existing literature, we adopt the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) . The LSV measure is designed to gauge whether a dispropor-17 Note that bond purchases made after one year since issuance and bond sales made before one year to maturity are defined as "active" trades.
tionate number of institutions are buying (selling) a certain security beyond the marketwide buying (selling) intensity in a given period. We estimate the herding measure for each bond-quarter. Specifically, our herding measure (HM) of bond i in quarter t is defined as for bond i in quarter t is expected to be zero. Therefore, a positive and significant average herding measure will be evidence for institutional herding in the corporate bond market.
Also, herding measures are defined in a way that adjusts for the overall trading pattern in a given quarter, therefore comparable across time.
Intuitively, herding is measured as the tendency of funds to trade a given bond together 18 In other words, under the null hypothesis, # of Buy i,t follows a binomial distribution with parameter n = # of Buy i,t + # of Buy i,t and p = E[p i,t ], where the proxy for E[p i,t ] is defined as # of Buy i,t /(# of Buy i,t + # of Sell i,t ). and in the same direction (either buy or sell) more often than would be expected if they trade randomly and independently. To capture the relative intensity of buy herding to sell herding, we also follow Wermers (1999) to define a buy herding measure (BHM) for bonds with a higher proportion of buyers than the average and a sell herding measure (SHM) for bonds with a lower proportion of buyers than the average. That is,
and
By definition, for a given bond in a given quarter, it has either a BHM or an SHM (but not both), depending on its buying intensity relative to the marketwide buying intensity in that quarter. 19 Under the null hypothesis of no buy (sell) herding, BHM (SHM) of an individual bond in a given quarter is expected to be zero. If institutions sell in herds more frequently than they buy in herds, the average SHM should be significantly larger than the average BHM.
The LSV herding measure can be estimated at the level of all funds or a subgroup of funds. In this paper, in addition to estimating HM, BHM, and SHM by all funds for a given bond, we estimate them separately for insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds.
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Empirical Results
In this section, we first estimate the levels of institutional herding in corporate bond trading.
We then study the determinants of such herding, separately for sell herding and buy herding.
Lastly, we provide evidence of persistence in herding and explore whether such persistence is driven by "following peers" or "following self."
Levels of Institutional Herding
In Table III , we present our estimated levels of herding exhibited by institutional investors of corporate bonds. Columns (1) and (2) The top row of Column (1) shows that the mean herding measure for all funds together is about 11 percent for all bonds that were traded by at least five funds. Intuitively, this result implies that if 100 funds trade a given bond in a given quarter, approximately 11 more funds trade on the same side of the market than would be expected if each fund chose bonds randomly and independently.
It is important to note that for all investor type, our estimated overall level of institutional herding in corporate bonds is substantially higher than what is documented for stocks. For instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) find that the average level of herding in stocks by pension funds is 2.7 percent, much lower than our finding of 8.6 percent for bond pension funds (Column (5)). Wermers (1999) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) document that the average level of herding in stocks by equity mutual funds is 3.4 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, also substantially lower than our finding of 9.6 percent for bond mutual funds (Column (3)). Moreover, insurance companies, the largest investor group of corporate bonds, have an even greater tendency to herd in bonds than mutual funds and pension funds do, boasting an average herding measure of 13.2 percent.
21 Note that when we apply this hurdle to each subgroup of investors, we require that bond-quarters should be traded by at least five investors in that particular subgroup. This is the reason why the number of qualified bond-quarters in Column (2) is greater than the number of qualified bond-quarters in Column (4), (6), or (8) .
Interestingly, the average herding measure estimated for all investors is higher than the same measure estimated for mutual funds and pension funds, suggesting that across different types of investors herds form as often as they do within some subgroups of investors. This finding suggests that different types of corporate bond investors may follow some common signals in trading.
We also separately calculate the average levels of buy herding and sell herding. As shown in Row (4) of Column (1), herding is significantly stronger on the sell side than on the buy side. This result is qualitatively similar to existing findings on herding in stocks. For example, Wermers (1999) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) also find stronger sell-side herding in stocks by mutual funds. However, not all types of funds behave the same way.
In fact, we find that only mutual funds herd more strongly on the sell side, while pension funds and insurance companies herd more strongly on the buy side.
The results on the level of herding are robust to our choice of the minimum number of institutions trading on the bond. In fact, the level of herding increases as more institutions trade on a bond. This result is different from what is documented for herding in stocks by Wermers (1999) , who finds that the level of herding in stocks does not monotonically increase, but actually slightly decreases, as more mutual funds trade on the stock.
Another interesting finding is that the relative level of sell herding to buy herding increases as more institutions trade on a bond, as shown in rows of "BHM-SHM". In particular, when we require at least 20 active trades for a bond in a quarter, the level of sell herding significantly dominates the level of buy herding for all types of bond investors. This finding suggests that when more institutional investors simultaneously choose to trade a certain bond, they are more likely to simultaneously sell it. In other words, the corporate bond market is more susceptible to fire sales risks.
Table III also provides the number of qualified bond-quarters, which drops substantially as higher trading hurdles are applied. In particular, mutual funds and insurance companies start with almost the same amount of qualified bond-quarters (around 140,000) when we require at least 5 active trades in a quarter. However, as we require at least 30 active trades, mutual funds still have about 14,000 qualified bond-quarters, while insurers are left with fewer than 7,000 qualified bond-quarters. This finding indicates that as a subgroup, mutual funds form larger trading herds a lot more frequently than other types of investors. Table IV reports the levels of herding for bonds in each rating group. Consistent with our conjecture that herding would be more likely to occur in riskier bonds, we find that the mean herding measure is 8.9, 11.6 and 21.8 percent for investment-grade, speculative-grade, and unrated bonds, respectively. We find similar patterns for all types of bond investors.
For the time trend of herding levels, Figure 3 illustrates that average buy herding levels trend down over time, mainly driven by mutual funds. Meanwhile, average sell herding levels trend up over time, purely driven by mutual funds.
Determinants of Herding
Having documented a high level of institutional herding in corporate bonds, we now explore the determinants of such herding behaviors. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999) identify two factors that explain mutual fund herding in stocks: size and previous-quarter return. In particular, the level of herding is higher in trades of small stocks; the level of buy herding is higher in stocks with higher previous-quarter return, while the level of sell herding is higher in stocks with lower previous-quarter return. We incorporate these two potential determinants of herding into our analyses, along with other bond characteristics.
We estimate the following model for buy and sell herding:
The dependent variable is the buy herding measure (or sell herding measure) of bond i in quarter t. RET i,t−τ is the abnormal return of bond i in quarter t − τ . RET 2 i,t−τ is the squared abnormal return of bond i in quarter t − τ . This term is intended to capture any nonlinearity in the sensitivity of herding behavior to past returns. U pGd i,t−τ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an upgrade for bond i during quarter t − τ and equals 0 otherwise. Similarly, DownGd i,t−τ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a downgrade for bond i during quarter t − τ . BHD i,t−τ and SHD i,t−τ are dummy variables that indicate herding directions of bond i in quarter t. We also control for various bond charateristics such as bond liquidity, size of outstanding, bond age, and number of years to maturity (for a full list and description of the dependent variables, see Appendix A).
Determinants of Buy Herding
We present in Table V the regression results for buy herding. In general, investors show a higher level of buy herding in bonds with higher abnormal returns in the previous year. As shown in Columns (1)-(4), the coefficients on the bonds' abnormal returns in the previous four quarters are all positive and significantly different from zero. Regression results within each subgroup of investors show that mutual funds and pension funds react more to recent bond returns (previous two quarter returns for mutual funds and previous quarter return for pension funds), while insurance companies could react with longer lags and form stronger buying herds in response to persistently good past performance. We do not find evidence that top-performing bonds attract disproportionally larger herds. In fact, Columns (2)- (5) of Table V report a slightly concave relationship between the level of buy herding and past abnormal returns.
Coefficients on rating upgrade and downgrade dummies are small in magnitude and less significant in the full sample, but they show interesting patterns for different types of investors. Specifically, insurance companies are more likely to herd to buy a bond if it experienced an upgrade, and less so after a downgrade. The coefficient estimates imply that for insurance companies, a rating upgrade in the previous quarter corresponds to a 120 basis point increase in the buy herding measure, and a downgrade in the previous quarter corresponds to a 130 basis point decrease in that. This result is consistent with the fact that it is more costly for insurance companies to hold lower-rated bonds due to regulatory constraints. In contrast, mutual funds and pension funds are more likely to herd to buy after a rating downgrade, and less so after an upgrade, likely taking advantage of market frictions created by regulations that insurance companies are subject to.
Herding in previous quarters substantially affects current-quarter buy herding levels.
Column (5) shows that buy-side herding tends to be lower if the bond experienced herding in recent quarters, regardless of whether it was from the buy side or from the sell side.
The coefficient estimates imply that experiencing buying herds in previous three quarters corresponds to a combined 190 basis point decrease in the current level of buy herding, and experiencing selling herds in previous three quarters corresponds to a combined 400 basis point decrease in the current level of buy herding. These results suggest that experiencing recent sell-side herding has a substantial and long-lasting negative influence on the current level of buy-side herding.
Other bond characteristics also help explain buy herding. First, investors are more likely to herd to buy speculative-grade bonds and bonds with smaller amounts outstanding, consistent with findings in the stock market by Wermers (1999) . Second, insurance companies form stronger herds to buy bonds that are newer and have longer time to maturity, while mutual funds and pension funds herd into seasoned bonds with longer time to maturity.
Lastly, all investors show higher levels of buy-side herding in low-liquidity bonds, especially pension funds.
Determinants of Sell Herding
In Table VI , we present the regression results for sell herding. Comparing R 2 results in Table   VI with those in Table V , we find that our independent variables have a lot more explanatory power for sell herding than for buy herding.
In general, investors show a higher level of sell-side herding in bonds with lower abnormal returns in the previous year. As shown in Columns (1)- (5) of Table VI , the coefficients on the bonds' abnormal returns in the previous four quarters are all negative and significantly different from zero. Regression results within each subgroup of investors show that pension funds react more to recent bond returns, while both mutual funds and insurance companies could react with longer lags. In particular, insurance companies form stronger selling herds in response to bad past performance.
More interestingly, we find evidence of a strong convex relationship between the level of sell herding and the past abnormal returns of the bond, shown in Columns (2)- (5). Investors appear to herd disproportionally more to sell bonds with extremely bad performance. Such a convex relationship suggests that bad past performance could trigger an abnormally large amount of simultaneous sells that further depresses prices-a downward spiral scenario.
For all investors, sell-side herding intensifies as a bonds' rating changes. In particular, the level of sell herding is significantly higher after rating downgrades, especially for mutual funds and insurance companies. The coefficient estimate in Column (5) implies that a downgrade of bond rating in the previous quarter corresponds to a 150 basis point increase in the level of sell-side herding. Interestingly, the level of sell herding is also significantly higher after rating upgrades. As shown in Column (5), an upgrade of bond rating in the previous quarter corresponds to a 130 basis point increase in the level of sell-side herding. These results imply that for bonds that are sold with higher intensity than the market average, any recent updates in ratings (whether upgrades or downgrades) have contributed to the selling herds.
Past herding directions substantially affect current sell herding levels. As shown in Column (5) or Table VI , whether the bond has experienced any buy-side herding in recent quarters does not affect its current level of sell herding. However, if a bond has been sold in herds in recent quarters, its current level of sell-side herding tends to be significantly higher.
The coefficient estimates show that experiencing selling herds in previous three quarters corresponds to a combined 260 basis point increase in the current level of sell-side herding. These results show that recent sell-side herding substantially exacerbates current selling pressure of the bond, and recent buy-side herding does not alleviate it. This finding suggests that sell herding is strongly persistent.
Other bond characteristics also contribute to explaining sell herding. First, investors, especially insurance companies, herd more to sell speculative-grade bonds than they do to sell investment-grade bonds. Second, all investors show a higher level of sell-side herding in bonds with smaller amounts outstanding. Third, all investors form stronger herds to sell bonds that are older and have shorter time to maturity. Lastly, only insurance companies show a significantly lower level of sell-side herding in low-liquidity bonds, while the coefficient is insignificant for mutual funds and pension funds after controlling for other factors.
Robustness
We conduct additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. These checks are as follows: (1) In reported results, standard errors are clustered at the bond level. We find that the significance of our results is not affected by either clustering standard errors at the quarter level or double-clustering at the bond-quarter level. (2) Controlling for quarter fixed effects and bond issuer fixed effects (identified by the first six digits of the CUSIP) does not qualitatively change our main results. (3) In our baseline regressions, we require that a bond be actively traded by at least five investors in a given quarter. Our main results remain robust if we require at least 10 active trades.
Intertemporal Herding and Imitational Trading
Regression results in Table V and Table VI strongly suggest persistence in institutional herding in corporate bonds, especially on the sell side. Figure 6 shows evidence of persistence in herding over adjacent quarters. Specifically, in each quarter we sort bonds with at least five active trades into quintiles based on their buy (sell) herding measures. Bonds with various degrees of buy herding are sorted into quintiles "B1"-"B5," with "B5" representing the group of bonds with the highest buy herding levels. Bonds with various degrees of sell herding are sorted into quintiles "S5"-"S1," with "S5" representing the group of bonds with the highest sell herding measures. Figure 6 suggests that if a bond is in the highest sell herding quintile in the current quarter, the chance of its making the highest sell herding quintile in the next quarter is over 40 percent, and the chance of its making the secondhighest sell herding quintile in the next quarter is almost 30 percent. 22 In general, a bond is most likely to be sorted into the same buy/sell herding quintile as in the quarter before.
As pointed out by Sias (2004) , the positive correlation of intertemporal herding can be driven either by institutional investors who follow others into and out of the same securities (i.e., imitation) or by individual institutional investors who follow their own last-quarter trades (i.e., habit). Sias (2004) shows that for equity institutional investors, imitation and habit contribute almost equally to the correlated intertemporal herding.
Following Sias (2004) , we attempt to decompose intertemporal persistence in trading.
(See Appendix 3 for full details of the decomposition.) Table VII reports the results of regression and decomposition. First, we find strong persistence in institutional demand for bonds over adjacent quarters. As shown in Panel A, using the full sample of bondquarters with at least one active institutional trader, the coefficient associated with the lagged standardized buying fraction averages 0.261, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In other words, the correlation between the institutional demand for bonds in this quarter and the demand in the previous quarter averages 0.261. This average correlation in bond trading is significantly higher than that in equity trading, which is about 0.119, as reported by Sias (2004) . Moreover, this strongly positive intertemporal correlation in bond trading holds for all subgroups of institutional investors. In particular, insurance companies have a substantially higher intertemporal correlation in bond trading than mutual funds and 22 We require that the bond is traded by at least five investors in both quarters and exclude bonds that are issued or maturing within one year. pension funds. This finding echoes the earlier result that herding within the same quarter is also stronger among insurance companies.
Second, results of the decomposition conducted on all institutional investors show that, on average, about one-fifth of the intertemporal correlation (i.e., 0.053 out of 0.261) is driven by institutional investors continuing to buy (or sell) the bonds they just bought (or sold) in the previous quarter, while the majority of the intertemporal correlation (i.e., 0.208 out of 0.261) is driven by investors imitating others' previous-quarter trades. These results are in contrast to those in Sias (2004) , who documents that the two factors contribute almost equally to the positive intertemporal correlation. Such a contrast suggests that while the persistence in institutional demand for stocks almost equally results from following self and following others, the strong persistence in institutional demand for corporate bonds is mostly driven by following others (i.e., imitation).
Third, we find some interesting variations in trading patterns among different types of investors when we decompose the intertemporal coefficient for each type of bond investors.
In particular, both mutual funds and pension funds tend to reverse their own trades in the previous quarter, as opposed to the results for all institutional investors, demonstrated by the negative following-self term, which is small in magnitude but statistically significant. However, insurance companies load a higher portion on the following-self term, which makes up about one-third of the intertemporal correlation (i.e., 0.085 out of 0.263). But when it comes to the following-others term, all types of investors have a strong tendency to follow their peers' trades in the previous quarter. For mutual funds and pension funds, the following-others term explains the entire persistence in bond demand, completely overshadowing the reversing effect indicated by the negative following-self term.
To address the concern that our result on persistence may be driven by bonds with relatively few institutional traders, in Panels B and C of Table VII, we further restrict the sample to bond-quarters with at least 5 and 10 institutional traders, respectively. 
Price Impact of Herding
A key issue of interest in studying institutional herding is whether herding stabilizes or destabilizes bond prices. By way of definition, herding stabilizes prices if herding-induced price changes are permanent, while herding destabilizes prices if herding-induced price changes reverse course subsequently. We use a portfolio approach to examine the relation between herding and bond returns in current and future quarters. We also investigate the relation between herding and past returns to further determine the extent to which herding is related to positive-feedback trading strategies.
Specifically, as decribed in Section 3.3, we form three zero-investment portfolios: S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5, where portfolios B5 and B1 include bonds with the highest and lowest institutional buy herding levels in each quarter, respectively, while portfolios S5 and S1
include bonds with the highest and lowest institutional sell herding levels in each quarter respectively. For example, portfolio S5-B5 represents a zero-investment portfolio that longs the S5 portfolio and shorts the S5 portfolio. All three portfolios represent contrarian trading strategies that go against the market trends.
while bond L is bought by 80 percent of 100 traders in the previous quarter and 90 percent of 100 traders in the current quarter. Since we take into account only the fraction of buying rather than the base number of traders, bond S will contribute more to the intertemporal correlation than bond L because bond S has a higher correlation of fractions of buying over the adjacent quarters. However, it is clear that the trading pattern of bond L represents the concept of "herding" and is more robust, as the trading pattern of bond S is more likely to be random.
We examine the quarterly equal-weighted abnormal returns for each of these contrarian portfolios before, during, and after the portfolio formation quarter. 24 If institutional herding is based on positive feedback, we would expect to see negative abnormal returns for all three portfolios (S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5) before the portfolio formation quarter. Also, we look at the long-term price impact of institutional herding after the portfolio formation quarter.
A significant return reversal after portfolio formation would indicate that herding drives bond prices away from their fundamental values and destabilizes bond prices, while a flat return after portfolio formation would imply that herding plays a more beneficial role in bond markets by accelerating price discovery.
Panel A of Table VIII presents the quarterly abnormal returns around the herding quarters for the zero-investment portfolios based on buy and sell herding levels. It shows that a higher level of sell herding is associated with lower abnormal returns prior to and during the portfolio formation quarter, and that a higher level of buy herding is associated with higher past abnormal returns. In particular, bonds heavily sold by institutions (S5), on average, underperform bonds heavily bought (B5) by about 67 to 111 basis points in terms of quarterly abnormal return during the four quarters prior to portfolio formation and 44 basis points during the portfolio formation quarter. These results suggest that feedback trading exists for both buy and sell herding portfolios.
In terms of post-herding price dynamics, bond returns revert immediately after the portfolio formation quarter for portfolios S5-B5 and S5-S1. In particular, the abnormal returns on both the S5-B5 and S5-S1 portfolios turn from negative to positive in the quarter immediately following portfolio formation and remain positive for an additional five quarters.
On the buy side, however, the abnormal returns on portfolio B1-B5 continue to be negative in the quarter immediately following portfolio formation and largely diminish afterward.
These results suggest that institutional herding destabilizes corporate bond prices, and such a destabilizing effect is mainly driven by sell herding.
24 Abnormal returns are calculated in the way described in Appendix A.
In Panel B of Table VIII , we repeat the tests on speculative-grade (junk) bonds, small bonds, and illiquid bonds. 25 We find that feedback trading and return reversal before and after the portfolio formation quarter is much stronger for all of these subgroups of bonds, especially junk bonds. In particular, junk bonds heavily sold by institutions (S5), on average, underperform bonds heavily bought (B5) by about 153 to 271 basis points in terms of quarterly abnormal return during the four quarters prior to portfolio formation, but they outperform by about 63 to 214 basis points in terms of quarterly abnormal return after portfolio formation. For small bonds and illiquid bonds, the patterns of feedback trading and return reversals are similar to those for junk bonds and larger in magnitude than those observed for all bonds. Results of portfolio returns on S5-S1 and B1-B5 for these three subgroups of bonds (not reported but illustrated in Figure 5 ) also show that return reversal is mainly driven by sell herding.
For a better illustration, Figure 5 plots quarterly abnormal returns on portfolios S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5 constructed with the full sample as well as subgroups of bonds in Panel A, and cumulative abnormal returns in Panel B (with the value at portfolio formation quarter t indexed to zero). For the full sample, the S5-B5 portfolio lost 4 percent in the four quarters leading up to portfolio formation quarter t but earns an abnormal return of about 2 percent within six quarters afterward. For high-yield bonds, the return reversal is much stronger, with a cumulative abnormal return of 6 percent in six quarters after portfolio formation.
Compared with junk bonds, small bonds and illiquid bonds display similar but smallerin-magnitude patterns. Panel B also presents the stark contrast between the cumulative abnormal returns on portfolio S5-S1 and those on portfolio B1-B5 after portfolio formation.
It shows that sell herding exerts large yet transitory pressure on bond prices, substantially driving the bond prices away from their fundamental values and causing excessive price volatility, while buy herding is likely to speed up price discovery.
We also look into the price impact of herding by different types of investors. Figure   6 plots cumulative abnormal returns on portfolios S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5 for insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. The return reversal patterns are very similar across different institution types, suggesting that herding by all three types of institutions contributes to the price dynamics of bonds. 27 Not surprisingly, the price reversal pattern in portfolio S5-B5 and S5-S1 is much stronger during the crisis period than during the noncrisis period. During the GFC, sell herding exerts drastic temporary price pressure, causing prices of heavily sold bonds to plunge more than 10 percent in a few quarters leading up to quarter t. As price pressure dissipates, prices of these bonds revert about 8 percent within two quarters after herding. In contrast, during normal times, the cumulative abnormal return after portfolio formation is less than 2 percent. Therefore, a trading strategy based on our portfolio method is most profitable when the market is under stress, when liquidity provision through acting as a contrarian is riskiest.
Our finding that institutional herding-in particular institutions' sell herding-destabilizes bond prices is new to the fixed-income literature. This evidence differs from the results in earlier papers on the stock market (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) ; Nofsinger and Sias (1999); and Wermers (1999) ). It is consistent with papers on the stock market that focus on more recent periods (Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013) ; Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011)) 26 The exact price impact of each type of institution is hard to disentangle because of correlated herding in certain bonds between subgroups of investors. We conduct unreported tests and find that mutual funds and pension funds are more likely to herd together than with insurance companies, and that sell herding across different types of investors is more positively correlated than buy herding. but is much stronger in magnitude.
28 Our evidence clearly points to the vulnerabilities associated with correlated trades of institutional investors. In particular, the price-destabilizing effect is strongest for the most risky bonds during periods of market distress, when liquidity is most needed. This finding highlights the role of herding in amplifying financial stability risks during market downturn-for example, as U.S. interest rate liftoff materializes.
Conclusion
Institutional investors play an increasingly important role in the function of the financial markets and resource allocation. However, when they herd in trading securities in a relatively illiquid market, the resulting price impact of asset fire sales may provide a strong amplification channel in transmitting financial stability risks. In this paper, we find that institutional investors do herd in the corporate bond market. Indeed, the average level of herding in the bond market, particularly among speculative-grade bonds, is much higher than what previous studies have documented for equity markets. We also present evidence of bond herding not only within a quarter, but also over adjacent quarters. The positive temporal correlation in institutional demand is found to be mostly driven by institutions following each other's trades.
We find that among major types of investors in corporate bonds, mutual funds are the most active institutional traders of corporate bonds and have shown a growing tendency to herd when they sell but not when they buy. Moreover, when investors herd to sell, the sensitivity of sell herding to past performance displays a convex relationship in that they react more strongly and unanimously to extremely bad past performance-a recipe for a run type of scenario.
Most important, we document an asymmetry in the price impact of institutional herding, 28 Temporary price impact and return reversals may exist for various reasons. Downward-sloping demand curves (Da and Gao (2009); Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2011)), dealers' inventory cost considerations (Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) , Khang and King (2004) ), or limits to arbitrage caused by market frictions (e.g., Li, Zhang, and Kim (2011) ) may all lead to such a finding. Pinning down the exact reason for price reversal is beyond the scope of the paper.
which highlights the role of herding in amplifying financial stability risks in market downturns. While buy herding is associated with permanent price impact that is consistent with price discovery, sell herding results in transitory price impact and thus excess price volatility. Sell herding causes significant price deviation from their fundamentals and reversal after several quarters. The price-destabilizing effect was especially strong for high-yield bonds, small bonds, and illiquid bonds, and during the global financial crisis period.
Overall, our evidence suggests that growing concerns about financial stability risks associated with herding behavior of corporate bond investors are warranted. Further research is needed to deepen our understanding of the underlying causes of herding behavior before any policy recommendations can be put forward. A Independent Variables Used in Model (3.1)
• Lagged abnormal return. We calculate quarterly raw bond returns using Merrill Lynch pricing data, adjusting for interest and coupon payments. In particular, the raw return for bond i in quarter t is calculated as
where P i,t is bond i's price at the start of quarter t, I i,t is accrued interest and D i,t is an indicator of whether coupon payment C i,t occurs during quarter t. The abnormal bond return is computed as the raw return subtracted by the size-weighted average return of the pool of bonds that share similar credit ratings, financial/nonfinancial classification, and time to maturity in that quarter.
• Bond rating change. We use rating information obtained from three rating agencies (Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch) to compute an average rating after converting letter ratings into numerical ratings. 29 Change of rating is calculated as the difference between the average numerical rating at the current quarter-end and that at the previous quarter-end. We also differentiate between upgrades and downgrades in regression specifications.
• Lagged levels of herding. It is possible that institutional herding in bonds is not only within one quarter but persists across multiple quarters as well. To control for this potential persistence, we generate dummies for different levels of herding in past quarters: BHD (i.e. Bought by Herd Dummy) and SHD (i.e., Sold by Herd Dummy). If bond i is sold with higher intensity than the average market trend and traded by at least five funds in quarter t − τ , it will be assigned with BHD i,t−τ = 0 and SHD i,t−τ = 1. Similarly, if bond i is bought with higher intensity than the average market trend and traded by at least five funds in quarter t − τ , it will be assigned with BHD i,t−τ = 1 and SHD i,t−τ = 0. If bond i is bought/sold with exactly the same intensity as the market trend OR traded by fewer than five funds in quarter t − τ , it will be assigned with BHD i,t−τ = 0 and SHD i,t−τ = 0.
• Bond liquidity. To examine the correlation between herding and bond liquidity, we use TRACE intraday transaction data to estimate three bond liquidity measures that are commonly used in the literature.
-Amihud (2002) price impact measure, defined as
where P (ordered by trading time) of bond i at day d, and N i,d is the total number of trades of bond i at day d. The Amihud measure indicates illiquidity in that a larger value implies that a trade of a given size would move the price more, suggesting higher illiquidity or lower market depth. See Kyle (1985) .
-Effective bid-ask spread based on the Roll (1984) model, which is a proxy for bond liqudity costs and defined as
-Indirect measure of bid-ask spread using the interquartile range (IQR) of trade prices, defined as the difference between the 75th percentile and 25th percentile of prices for the day:
We then incorporate all three measures to calculate a comprehensive liquidity measure for each bond in each quarter. 31 To address the concern of possible endogeneity between a bond's liquidity and its herding level in a given quarter, we take a lifetime average of the bond's liquidity measures and use it as the bond's overall liquidity measure.
• Other bond characteristics, including a dummy variable indicating whether the bond is investment-grade or not, size of outstanding (in thousands of dollars), age (measured as the number of quarters since issuance), and time to maturity (measured in quarters).
B Decomposing Intertermporal Correlation in Trading
Following Sias (2004), we define the standardized fraction of institutional investors buying bond i in quarter t (denoted as q i,t ) as
where p i,t is the fraction of trading institutions buying bond i in quarter t, p t is the crosssectional average (across I securities) of p i,t , and σ(p i,t ) is the cross-sectional standard deviation (across I securities) of p i,t . By definition, standardized fraction q i,t has zero mean and unit variance. In each quarter, we estimate a cross-sectional regression of the standardized buying fraction q i,t on its lag term q i,t−1 :
Because both the dependent and independent variables are standardized and scaled to zero mean, the intercept term of the regression model is zero, and the coefficient β t is simply the correlation between institutional demand in this quarter and in the previous quarter. To examine whether such intertemporal correlations are driven by imitating others or following one's own habits, following Sias (2004) , we decompose β t into two components as follows:
where I t is the number of bonds traded by institutional investors in quarter t, N i,t is the number of institutional investors trading bond i in quarter t, and D n,i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 (0) if the trader n is a buyer (seller) of bond i in quarter t. The first term is the portion of the correlation that results from institutional investors following themselves into and out of the same bond. In particular, it will be positive if institutions tend to follow their previous quarter's trades, and it will be negative if institutions tend to reverse their previous quarter's trades. The second term is the portion of the correlation that results from institutional investors following others. We also re-estimate the regression model within each subgroup of investors (mutual fund, pension fund, and insurance company) and recalculate the decomposition for each subgroup. Specifically, for a given institution type W , the estimation and decomposition of the coefficient are done as follows: This figure plots time series of total trading frequencies and volumes of corporate bonds between 1998:Q3 and 2014:Q3, broken down into three institutional investor types: insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Bonds that are issued or maturing within one year are excluded from this chart. We define a "sell" ("buy") of bond i by fund j in quarter t if fund j's holdings of bond i increase (decrease) from the end of quarter t − 1 to the end of quarter t. Panel A plots time series of total trading (buying and selling) frequencies by investor type. Panel B plots time series of total trading (buying and selling) volumes by investor type. 
, where p i,t is the proportion of funds trading bond i during quarter t that are buyers. E|p i,t − E[p i,t ]| is calculated under the null hypothesis that funds trade bonds independently and randomly. The buy herding measure BHM i,t is calculated for bonds with a higher proportion of buyers than the average and is defined as
. Similarly, the sell herding measure SHM i,t is calculated for bonds with a higher proportion of sellers than the average and is defined as
Herding measures for each subgroup of investors are all recalculated within each subgroup. In each quarter, we average buy (sell) herding measures over bonds with a higher (lower) proportion of buyers than the market average and traded by at least five funds. This figure plots histograms of future herding levels of bonds based on their current herding levels. Over the 1998:Q3-2014:Q3 sample period, in each quarter we sort bonds with at least five active trades into quintiles based on their buy (sell) herding measures. Bonds bought with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "B1"-"B5" (indicated by "1" to "5" in the chart), with "B5" (or "5" in the chart) representing the group of bonds with the highest buy herding measures. Bonds sold with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "S5"-"S1" (indicated by "-5" to "-1" in the chart), with "S5" (or "-5" in the chart) representing the group of bonds with the highest sell herding measures. The figure shows the probability of being sorted into a certain buy (or sell) quintile in the following quarter conditional on what buy (or sell) quintile the bond currently belongs in, given that the bonds are traded by at least five institutional investors in both quarters. Bonds issued or maturing within one year are excluded. This figure illustrates abnormal returns (both quarterly and cumulative) on zero-investment portfolios S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5 before and after portfolio formation. Bonds' abnormal return is computed as the raw quarterly return subtracted by the size-weighted average return of the pool of bonds that share similar credit ratings, financial/nonfinancial classification, and time to maturity. The cumulative abnormal return is indexed to zero in the portfolio formation quarter. In each quarter, bonds bought with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "B1" to "B5," with "B5" representing the group of bonds with the highest buy herding measures. Bonds sold with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "S5" to "S1", with "S5" representing the group of bonds with the highest sell herding measures. Zero-investment portfolio S5-B5 is constructed in a contrarian manner, long the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that institutional investors most strongly sold as a herd (i.e., S5) and short the equal-weighted portfolio containing bond that institutional investors most strongly bought as a herd (i.e., B5). Portfolios S5-S1 and B1-B5 are similarly defined. This figure also exhibits abnormal returns on portfolios constructed from bond subgroups. A "small" bond is a bond whose outstanding amount is in the bottom two size quintiles in a quarter. An "illiquid" bond is a bond whose overall liquidity measure is in the bottom two liquidity quintiles. t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Portfolio S5-S1, in Percent This figure illustrates cumulative abnormal returns on zero-investment portfolios S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5 constructed based on herding measures of investor subgroups, before and after portfolio formation quarter t. Bonds' quarterly abnormal return is computed as the raw quarterly return subtracted by the size-weighted average return of the pool of bonds that share similar credit ratings, financial/nonfinancial classification, and time to maturity. The cumulative abnormal return is indexed to zero in the portfolio formation quarter. Within each subgroup of investors (insurance company, mutual fund, or pension fund), in each quarter, bonds bought with higher intensity than the submarket average are sorted into quintile "B1" to "B5," with "B5" representing the group of bonds with the highest subgroup buy herding measures. Bonds sold with higher intensity than the submarket average are sorted into quintile "S5" to "S1," with "S5" representing the group of bonds with the highest subgroup sell herding measures. For each subgroup of investors, zero-investment portfolio S5-B5 is constructed in a contrarian manner, long the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that the subgroup of investors most strongly sold as a herd (i.e., S5) and short the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that the subgroup of investors most strongly bought as a herd (i.e., B5). Portfolios S5-S1 and B1-B5 are similarly defined. For each subgroup of investors, bonds traded by fewer than five investors of that subgroup in a given quarter are excluded. This figure illustrates cumulative abnormal returns on zero-investment portfolios S5-B5, S5-S1, and B1-B5 constructed based on herding measures during the global financial crisis and normal times. Bonds' quarterly abnormal return is computed as the raw quarterly return subtracted by the size-weighted average return of the pool of bonds that share similar credit ratings, financial/nonfinancial classification, and time to maturity. The cumulative abnormal return is indexed to zero in the portfolio formation quarter. In each quarter, bonds bought with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "B1" to "B5," with "B5" representing the group of bonds with the highest buy herding measures. Bonds sold with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "S5" to "S1," with "S5" representing the group of bonds with the highest sell herding measures. Zero-investment portfolio S5-B5 is constructed in a contrarian manner, long the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that investors most strongly sold as a herd (i.e., S5) and short the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that investors most strongly bought as a herd (i.e., B5). Portfolios S5-S1 and B1-B5 are constructed in a similar way. Bonds traded by fewer than five investors in a given quarter are excluded. Crisis period is defined as 2007:Q3-2009:Q2, and noncrisis period is defined as 1998: Q3-2005:Q4 and 2010:Q4-2014:Q3 . Note that we track portfolio returns four quarters before and six quarters after the portfolio formation quarter, and our definition of crisis/noncrisis period controls for the spillover effect. t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Portfolio B1-B5
All Time Crisis Non-Crisis (1998:Q3-2006:Q4, 2007:Q1-2010:Q4, and 2011:Q1-2014:Q3) and three types (insurance company, mutual fund, and pension fund). In the "Holding" columns, we average total dollar values and numbers of corporate bonds across all funds and all quarters in each subperiod. In the "Quarterly Trading" columns, we define a fund as a buyer (seller) of bond i in quarter t if its holdings of bond i increase (decrease) from the end of quarter t − 1 to the end of quarter t. (Note that when a fund first purchases a certain bond, it has no holding of that bond in the previous quarter, and when a fund liquidates its position in a certain bond, it sometimes does not have a "zero" holding of that bond in the next quarter. We take these special cases into consideration and include all "initial buying" and "liquidating selling" in our calculation.) Therefore, for each fund in each quarter, we can count the number of bonds sold and bought by that fund. We then average the number of trading across all funds and all quarters in each subperiod. In the "Quarterly Active Trading" columns, we exclude "buying" and "selling" of bonds that are issued or maturing within one year from the calculation. 1998:Q3-2006:Q4, 2007:Q1-2010:Q4, and 2011:Q1-2014:Q3) and two risk levels (investment-grade and high-yield). Bonds that are issued or maturing within one year are excluded from this table. In the "Bond Characteristics" columns, we average amount outstanding (in million $), bond age, and timeto-maturity across all bonds and all quarters in each subperiod. In the "Holding Information" columns, for each bond in each quarter, we count the number of eMAXX investors that have nonzero holdings of the bond and aggregate holdings across all of these investors. Then we take averages across all bonds and all quarters in each subperiod. In the "Quarterly Trades" columns, we define a fund as a buyer (seller) of bond i in quarter t if its holdings of bond i increase (decrease) from the end of quarter t − 1 to the end of quarter t. (Note that when a fund first purchases a certain bond, it has no holding of that bond in the previous quarter, and when a fund liquidates its position in a certain bond, it sometimes does not have a "zero" holding of that bond in the next quarter. We take these special cases into consideration and include all "initial buying" and "liquidating selling" in our calculation.) Therefore, for each bond in each quarter, we can count the number of institutions that sell and buy that bond. We then average the number of sellers and buyers across all bonds and all quarters in each subperiod. (6) shows the mean of BHM i,t (calculated for the subgroup of mutual funds only), which is averaged over all bond-quarters with higher buying intensity than the market and traded by at least 10 mutual funds, and Column (4)×Row (6) shows that there are 43,328 bond-quarters qualified for the calculation of this mean. We also compute the difference between the mean of BHM i,t and SHM i,t and report the significance of it being different from zero. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. is a dummy that equals 1 if there is an upgrade (downgrade) of ratings in quarter t − τ and equals 0 otherwise. BHD t−τ (i.e., Bought in Herd Dummy) and SHD t−τ (i.e., Sold in Herd Dummy) indicate herding directions and levels in quarter t − τ . In particular, BHD = 0 and SHD = 1 if the bond is sold with higher intensity than the market average and traded by at least five funds, BHD = 1 and SHD = 0 if the bond is bought with higher intensity than the market average and traded by at least five funds, and BHD = 0 and SHD = 0 if the bond is bought or sold with exactly the same intensity as the market average or traded by less than five funds. This table reports the decomposition of the correlation between institutional demand for corporate bonds and lagged institutional demand between 1998:Q3-2014:Q3. q i,t is the standardized fraction of institutional investors buying bond i in quarter t, with zero mean and unit variance. We estimate quarterly cross-sectional regressions of q i,t on q i,t−1 . The regression coefficients are also the correlation between institutional demand and lag institutional demand. The second column reports the time-series average of R 2 associated with these quarterly regressions. The third column reports the time-series average of these correlation coefficients and associated t-statistics in parentheses. The last two columns report the portion of the correlation that results from institutional investors following their own lagged trades and the portion that results from institutions following the previous trades of other institutions, defined in Equation (B.3) and Equation (B.4). Panels A, B, and C limit the sample to bonds with at least 1, 5, or 10 trades in both quarters (current and lagged), respectively. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports abnormal quarterly returns (in percent) on zero-investment portfolios constructed based on bonds' herding measures. Bonds' abnormal return is computed as the raw quarterly return subtracted by the size-weighted average return of the pool of bonds that share similar credit ratings, financial/nonfinancial classification, and time to maturity. Over the 1998:Q3-2014:Q3 sample period, in each quarter we sort bonds with at least five active trades into quintiles based on their buy (sell) herding measures. Bonds bought with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "B1" to "B5," with "B5" representing the group of bonds with the highest buy herding measures. Bonds sold with higher intensity than the market average are sorted into quintile "S5" to "S1," with "S5" representing the group of bonds with the highest sell herding measures. Zero-investment portfolio S5-B5 is constructed in a contrarian manner, long the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that institutional investors most strongly sold as a herd (i.e., S5) and short the equal-weighted portfolio containing bonds that institutional investors most strongly bought as a herd (i.e., B5). Portfolios S5-S1 and B1-B5 are similarly defined. The abnormal quarterly returns on these zero-investment portfolios are reported four quarters before the portfolio formation and six quarters after. In panel B, we report abnormal quarterly returns on portfolio S5-B5 for bond subgroups. A "small" bond is a bond whose outstanding amount is in the bottom two size quintiles in a quarter. An "illiquid" bond is a bond whose overall liquidity measure is in the bottom two liquidity quintiles. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
